"I realise that some of my criticisms may be mistaken; but to refuse to criticize judgements for fear of being mistaken is to abandon criticism altogether... If any of my criticisms are found to be correct, the cause is served; and if any are found to be incorrect the very process of finding out my mistakes must lead to the discovery of the right reasons, or better reasons than I have been able to give, and the cause is served just as well." -Mr. HM Seervai, Preface to the 1st ed., Constitutional Law of India.

Wednesday, October 19, 2016

Soumya Murder Case: Awaiting the debate between Justice Katju and the Supreme Court Bench (Guest Post)

Ms. Prerana Saraf, who writes at Legal Parley, has contributed this guest post on the Sowmya murder case and the recent order of the Supreme Court pertaining to Justice Katju. The guest post is reproduced below (with a few formatting changes).

Govindswamy v. State of Kerala came into the limelight after Markandey Katju, retired Supreme Court judge blamed the judges of making a grave error by acquitting the accused of murder on the basis of hearsay evidence in his personal blog, Satyam Bruyat.

In his blog post dated 17th September, 2016, Markandey Katju questions how Supreme Court could rely on hearsay evidence which is inadmissible as evidence. He also mentions Section 300 of IPC, which reads that an accused is guilty of murder even if he had no intention to kill, if he has caused grievous wound that is sufficient to cause death.

On the basis of what has been observed in paragraph 398 of the judgment, he says that the Court has erred in its judgment and requests the court to review the same.


On 1st February, 2011, the deceased boarded the Ernakulam-Shornur Passenger Train at 5:30 PM to go to her home at Shornur. She boarded the ladies division of the last compartment. However, when the train reached Mulloorkara, all other lady passengers alighted the bus. Therefore, the deceased also got down with them and entered the ladies coach just in front of the last compartment. The accused saw that the deceased was alone and entered the ladies compartment as soon as the train left the Vallathol Nagar Railway station. The prosecution alleged that the accused assaulted the deceased and repeatedly hit her head against the walls of the compartment.

It is then alleged that the victim was dropped/pushed by the accused from the running train to the track. The accused also jumped from the other side, after which he lifted the victim to another place by the side of the track and sexually assaulted her.

The prosecution in support of their case had examined 83 witnesses. Among them Witness No. 4 and 40 were travelling in the general compartment and had heard the woman crying and wailing. Even though witness No. 4 wanted to pull the chain, he was told by a middle aged man that the woman had jumped off the train and made good her escape and that he should not take the matter any further as they would all then be dragged to the court. The witnesses brought the incident to the attention of the guard as soon as they reached Shornur, which triggered the search for both the victim and accused. The victim was then found in badly injured condition by the side of the track.


On the basis of the forensic evidence, the court found the accused guilty of rape under Section 376 of IPC and confirmed the imposition of life sentence as awarded by Trial Court and confirmed by High Court. With respect to the charge of murder against the accused under Section 302 of IPC, it was observed that the death was a result of two sets of injury. 

The court was of the opinion that the fact that first set of injury was caused by the accused did not need reconsideration, as it was already clear with the witnesses’ statement and the forensic report. 

However, the second set of injury was caused due to the victim’s fall from the train. The court was of the opinion that unless the fall from the train can be ascribed to the accused on the basis of reliable evidence as against the possibility of deceased herself jumping out, the liability of the accused for the victim’s death cannot be determined. 

In this connection, it was the state’s contention that owing to the first set of injury that had impaired her mental reflexes, the deceased could not have been in a position to jump off the train.

However, the court observed that the circumstances against the accused had to be weighed against the oral evidence of the witnesses. The statement wherein it is said that a middle-aged man told them that the girl had jumped off the train and made her escape.

Also, according to the forensic report, the death was caused due to the supine position (head and torso facing upwards) that the victim laid in. Here again, the court observed that the victim was kept in supine position only for the purpose of sexual assault and the fact that the victim was alive for a few days after the incident goes on to establish that the accused had no intention of killing the deceased.


The court, therefore held that the accused cannot be convicted of murder under Section 302 of IPC. The bench instead held him guilty under Section 325 of IPC, which provides punishment for voluntarily causing grievous hurt.

Suo motu notice by Supreme Court:

A three judge bench consisting of Justices Ranjan Gogoi, P.C. Pant and U.U. Lalit took suo motu judicial notice of Justice Katju's blog criticising the order and called for a debate on the case.

The order was passed after a review petition was filed by the state. The bench observed that it was not appropriate to take a decision until the debate with Justice Katju was over.

Justice Katju posted on his Facebook page that he has not received any official letter from the court. He has however, been informed by the Kerala State Advocate on record and he would be delighted to appear and discuss the case in the open court provided the Court feels that Article 124(7) does not debar him on account of him being a former Supreme Court judge.

Well, this would be one hearing to look forward to and hopefully the discussion would provide the victim and her family the justice she deserves.  

Friday, October 14, 2016

The Debate on the Law Commission's Questionnaire on the Uniform Civil Code: Some Comments

This post pertains to Questionnaire published by the Law Commission of India about reforming personal laws and the uniform civil code. The post is in two parts (both published in this post). The first part of the post attempts to answer the questionnaire. The second part of the post discusses a more serious aspect about the role of the Law Commission of India.

I: Responses to Law Commission's Questionnaire

[Disclaimer: This post represents the author's, and not the blog's view, on the questionnaire. The lead co-author, who is an expert in constitutional law (and this author is neither an expert on constitutional law nor on personal laws), we're sure, has a more nuanced perspective to the entire issue.]

The questions in the Commission's questionnaire are in italics.

1. Are you aware that Article 44 of the Constitution of India provides that “the State shall endeavour to secure for the citizens a Uniform Civil Code throughout the territory of India”? 

Yes. This matter requires further initiatives for the following reason:

The Directive Principles of State Policy (hereinafter “Directive Principles”) have been enshrined in the Indian Constitution primarily in order to promote social and economic justice. As per Article 37, these Principles shall be “fundamental in the governance of the country” and the Constitution of India has mandated “the State to apply these principles in making laws.” In the course of the Constituent Assembly debates, several members opposed to the idea of a uniform civil code, it was observed that a uniform law applicable to all would promote national unity and, at the same time, no legislature would forcibly amend personal law if people were opposed to it. 

At this juncture in Indian polity, considering the opposition to a complete disregard to personal laws and bringing in a uniform civil code it its stead, a civil code on aspects hitherto covered by personal laws may be a drastic move and may lack legitimacy. As noted by the Constituent Assembly, ultimately, the citizens should be subjected to one civil code. Hence, introduction of a Uniform Civil Code should be a gradual process. At the same time, personal laws are being regarded as biased, especially against gender. Many a time, personal laws operate harshly against a particular gender, which is against the Constitution of India. These realities must be kept in mind in a debate on the subject. 

Broadly, the reforms towards a Uniform Civil Code should be a two-step process. The first step should be bring about comprehensive reforms to personal laws thereby eliminating all aspects which discriminate against a particular gender and bringing them in line with the fundamental rights and the Constitution of India. The first step includes codification of customary practices in each personal laws and ensuring a uniform code under each personal law. Once sufficient reforms are achieved, the second step is to introduce a Uniform Civil Code.

Q. No. 2 regarding the ambit of a Uniform Civil Code does not arise in view of Answer to Q. No. 1. However, if introduced it should cover all aspects presently covered by personal laws. 

3. Do you think the existing personal laws and customary practices need codification? 

Personal laws and customary practices should be codified to bring clarity in them and prevent uncertainty in application. Codification will be very helpful in bringing such practices in line with the Constitution.

4. Will the Uniform Civil Code or the codification of personal laws and customary practices bring about gender equality?

Yes. Both per se cannot strictly bring about gender equality. But a UCC or codification will help bring certainty to these laws and practices and will enable ease of testing them for constitutional consonance. 

5. Should the Uniform Civil Code be optional?

As stated in answer to Q. No.1, in the two-step process, neither should be optional. The first step in codifying and reforming personal laws and the second step in bringing about a Uniform Civil Code. 

6. Polygamy, polyandry and similar customary practices should be banned as they are not in tune with the current circumstances. 

Reforming personal laws should include these aspects as well.

7. Triple talaq operates harshly against women and should be abolished in toto.

8. Do you think that steps should be taken to ensure that Hindu women are better able to exercise their right to property, which is often bequeathed to sons under customary practices?

None of the three options suggested by the Commission are appropriate. Following are the measures that could be adopted:

It is true that in many families, the testator bequeaths immovable property to sons rather than daughters. This author had the opportunity to deal with a similar case. While it is acknowledged that this is predominantly a social issue, a few safeguards in law could be taken: A provision should be introduced in the Indian Succession Act, 1925 to the effect that any bequest denied to a female heir but made to a male heir on the ground that the testator spent money and resources in getting her married or such similar reason should be void.

Another measure that could be adopted is that wills which deny benefit to a female heir but which grant the benefit to a male heir should be viewed as a suspicious circumstance per se. This would be rule of evidence than a substantive legal rule. This principle should be statutorily recognized so that the burden lies on the propounder to establish that there were sufficient reasons to deny the female heir of the bequest. 

9. Do you think that a two-year wait period for Christians violates Christian women’s right to equality?

Yes, it does. The wait period should be made uniform across all religions. The present two-year wait period operates as a source of corruption. Judges at their option apply decisions of certain High Courts (Kerala, the Karnataka and Bombay [Nagpur Bench] High courts) reading the two year waiting period as one year. 

10. Do you think that there should be a uniform consent age for marriage across all personal laws?

Yes. Consent is a matter of body and mind and has very little to do with which religion a person belongs to.

11. Do you agree that all religious denominations should have common grounds for divorce?

c. Not necessarily, However, the grounds should be the same for men and women. 

12. Would a uniform civil code address the problems of insufficient maintenance?

Yes it would. Even if the (suggested) first step to codify and reform personal laws is implemented as a first step, the law on maintenance should be able to adequately address the problem of insufficient maintenance. This is because maintenance is more a matter of economic security to ensure that the woman leads a dignified life and is not at all a matter of religion. 

13. How can compulsory registration of marriages be implemented better?

a. Temples, churches, mosques and other religious places which conduct marriages should be obligated to counsel the parties to the marriage to get their marriage registered.

b. Before issuing identity cards such as Aadhar Card, licence, ration card or documents such as passports, etc., the husband or the wife or the parent, as the case may be, applying for the said document, should furnish proof of marriage registration irrespective of the religion. 

14. What measures should be taken to protect couples who enter into inter-religious and inter-case marriages?

a. Special Marriage Act should be made simpler. Registration offices should not insist on producing marriage cards or receipts of proof of marriage, which they do in case of such marriages, even though the Act does not strictly mandate it. The Registration offices should, instead be offices where marriage is conducted in the presence of sufficient witnesses.

b. Where such marriages take place or registrations take place, the same should be adequately videographed and documented.

c. Special Protection Homes should be introduced in such cases where the bride and the groom fear their safety. Suitable counselors should be appointed. Special training should be given in trades and crafts to them and suitable economic opportunities such as jobs in self-help groups, etc. should be facilitated. 

15. Would a uniform civil code infringe an individual’s right to freedom of religion?

No, it would not. If a uniform criminal law does not infringe an individual right’s to freedom, a uniform code will not infringe on an individual right to freedom of religion. Further, Constitution of India is supreme and anything that conflicts with the Constitution cannot remain above the Constitution. However, as stated in response to question no. 1, this is not the appopriate time for bringing about a uniform civil code. 

16. What measures should be taken to sensitise the society towards a common code or a codification of personal law?

Firstly, the codification and reforms to be brought out should be from the specific communities themselves. Such codes should come from the communities themselves. Secondly, Law Commission should assess each such code for their constitutional compatibility with jurists and experts well-versed with each personal law and thrash out all outstanding issues and thereby reform and codify personal laws. 

Once these reformed and codified personal laws are implemented and their success gauged, introduction of a Uniform Civil Code will become a legitimate exercise.

Part II: Shouldn't Law Commission be Made an Independent Statutory Body?

The recent attack by certain sections of certain religions vehemently attacked the Law Commission's questionnaire. Among other allegations, the prominent one was that the questionnaire was an attempt by the Government-in-power to target certain religious communities. Irrespective of the validity of such a criticism, such comments reflect poorly on the Law Commission. The Commission is supposed to be a prestigitous body instrumental in initiating, discussing and suggesting reforms in law. Such allegations lower the image of the Commission. Another aspect is that the task of the Commission inherently involves the possibility of criticising the Government-in-power's laws and testing their effectiveness. Often the views of the Commission can (and at times, should) be in contradiction with the Government's views. For these reasons, the Law Commission must be an independent statutory body. It is time for a suitable legislation for making the Law Commission a statutory body and ensuring its independence and competence by a suitable process constituting it and laying down its framework. 

(P.S. Forgive us readers for not posting Part II of Sasan Power. We are in the process of completing the second part (Part II will deal with the MP High Court decision) and we will also post the concluding part hopefully by next week. Lots to post on, especially the recent decision of the Supreme Court on arbitrability of disputes involving allegations of fraud. )

Saturday, October 1, 2016

Reforms on Court Fee to Set Aside Arbitral Award in Tamil Nadu

A recent Report by the Court Fee Rationalisation Committee in Tamil Nadu has recommended that the court fee for setting aside arbitral awards be made ad valorem.  Court Fee for setting aside an arbitral award under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is currently on Rs. 5,000/- irrespective of the quantum of the award.

The Court Fee Rationalisation Committee (CFRC) was constituted by a Division Bench of the Madras High Court vide order dt.  18.12.2015 pursuant to several writ petitions. The fundamental reason why the Committee was constituted was to address the anomaly in court fee in plaints in the original side of the High Court and that of other courts ("[C]ourt fees is levied on plaints filed in the original jurisdiction of the High Court at 1% ad valorem on a tapering scale while court fees is levied on plaints filed in courts subordinate to the High Court at 7.5% ad valorem on a flat scale."). The Committee's primary recommendation was to reduce the court fee from 7.5% to 2-3%. On arbitration, the Committee noted that the court fee for challenging arbitral awards should be made ad valorem and the percentage to be charged should be same as that of suit, that is, 2-3%. The Committee further noted that the maximum court fee to be charged in such actions should be Rs. 1,00,000. The Committee was of the view that the same recommendations should apply to petitions under Section 48 as well.

It is intuitive that a party would be willing to take file a petition to set aside arbitral awards so as to postpone payment even if the grounds of challenge of the arbitral awards are frivolous, especially in a legal environment where indemnity costs are not imposed for frivolous challenges and the rate of interest awarded is less. It is also intuitive that the court fee payable for setting aside an arbitral award will have a lot of bearing on a party deciding whether to challenge an arbitral award issued against it.

The existing fee regime in Tamil Nadu, however, provided for Rs. 5,000 as the court fee for setting aside arbitral awards. This neither has the potential to deter frivolous challenges to awards nor reflects the considerable court time in hearing these matters, especially when the dispute forming the subject of the award is complicated. Therefore, the recommendation of the Committee to make the court fee ad valorem is welcome. In fact, we had previously advocated the same in several forums [See, for instance, Developing India as a Hub of International Arbitration: A Misplaced Dream? (page 107)( July 2016)and this Letter to the Government].
However, it is doubtable if the cap would make the increase in court fee effective at all. In case of large disputes, the proposed cap on maximum court will will prove ineffective as the cap will eliminate the effect of court fee as one of the methods of reducing frivolous challenges in case of disputes with larger stakes.

Considering the policy of law towards a general deference to arbitral awards, it is suggested that the court fee for challenging awards be around 7.5% to 8%. But a provision could be made that in case of arbitral awards against individuals or other "persons" (such as Micro, Small undertakings, individuals, etc.) who establish their inability to pay the court fee, appropriate security such as bank guarantee or any other mode of security could be sought to ensure that such parties are not denied access to justice merely because of their inability to cough up court fee.

The Report can be downloaded from here.

Tuesday, September 27, 2016

The Worth of an Indian LL.M.: Possible Solutions (Part II & Concluding Part)

The previous post in this blog dealt with the problems that beset the LL.M. programme in India. This post proposes certain solutions in addressing the problems identified therein. It may be noted that the solutions suggested are tentative and a lot of further research and experimentation is required to test the applicability of these solutions in various contexts.


Changing Goals of the LL.M. Programme: There has been a marked change in the way in which institutions view the LL.M. programme in India. Gone are the days when LL.M. was viewed as an entry point for law teaching. Even in 2001, the Curriculum Development Committee of the UGC felt that a thorough knowledge of a particular field of law was the purpose of the LL.M. programme, irrespective of whether the students opt to study it for “teaching, practice of law, administration of justice or management of legal counseling in a firm”. The NKC WG (Working Group of the National Knowledge Commission) recommended that there was a need to introduce internship programmes at the LL.M. level. The UGC Guidelines give scope for practical training at a postgraduate level. The said Guidelines insists that the courses offered in the LL.M. programme shall have “practical training and research” and that the students should be evaluated for grades based on their performance in these aspects. At p. 8, the UGC Guidelines mandates in respect of the courses to be undertaken in the LL.M. programme the following: 
Each of these courses will have a practical training and research component for students to perform on which evaluation for grades is determined.” (emphasis mine)
Considering these aspects, it would not be wrong to conclude that the shift in the goal of the LL.M. programme has taken place even at the policy level. Consequently, Universities/ Institutions cannot simply stand by the orthodox position that the goal of LL.M. programme is only to equip students to teach law. Even for the traditional notion of LL.M., internship and other means of practical training will only help postgraduate students become better law teachers. Further, with the changing landscape of Indian legal profession and the opening up of the Indian legal sector to foreign players in the near future, continuing with the orthodox view of LL.M. would be to do disservice to the students and the legal sector. Therefore, it is of utmost importance that Universities/ Institutions expand their vision of the LL.M. programme and not constrict its ambit to merely being a factory for law teachers.

Change in Dogmatic Approach of Law Faculty: A related aspect is that there should be a drastic change in the teaching methodology to the postgraduate students. Universities/ institutions imparting legal education and regulators/ quasi-regulators of legal education such as the Bar Council of India and the University Grants Commission stress on practical approach to legal education both at the undergraduate and the post-graduate level. While Universities/ Institutions these days insist on compulsory internship, there is hardly any focus on practical approaches to law at the Masters level. While it is true that at the LL.M. level, a theoretical approach should be the foundation, theory unsupported by practice becomes irrelevant [see, Jayanth K. Krishnan, Professor Kingsfield Goes to Delhi: American Academics, the Ford Foundation, and the Development of Legal Education in India, 46 American Journal of Legal History 447-499, 474-475 (2004)(noting how American law professors presented practical dimensions to “even the most doctrinally-based courses”)]. Besides, in order to afford a critical approach to law, learning law from a practical standpoint becomes indispensable. For this purpose, it becomes important for the faculty members to have in-depth knowledge of law-in-practice in the course which they propose to teach. The means of acquiring such in-depth knowledge is the challenge to the legal education sector in India.

Student Quality: In order to address the problem of failure of students to match the rigours of the LL.M. programme, the following measures are suggested:
  • One way of dealing with this problem is to have an entrance exam with high standards and keep a relatively high cut-off so that only students who are able to cross the threshold are taken. This is already in existence, However, there are a few problems with this approach: For instance, fixing a high cut-off may not work in the current format of Common Law Admission Test (CLAT) as the choice of the institution depends predominantly on ranking of the applicant in the exam. Another problem is that this may eliminate candidates who are otherwise proficient but are not able to do the entrance well for reasons extraneous to their knowledge or ability. 
  • Another method to ensure better quality of students is to make the students shortlisted for admission attend rigorous pre-admission orientation. Courses in these pre-admission orientations should be similar to crash courses but should be based on subjects such as constitutional law of India, jurisprudence, basic legal research methodology, international law, etc. This will provide a stronger foundation to enable them meet the standards of the LL.M. programme.
Improving Quality of Legal Research at the LL.M. Level: Another contributor to the dismal state of the LL.M. programme in India is the lack of incisive legal research at the LL.M. level. The previous Part of this series identified the lack of training in legal research at the undergraduate level as a chief contributor to this state of affairs. Institution offering LL.M. courses could improve the quality of research skills by making submission of research work a part of evaluation in each course. In fact, The UGC Guidelines contemplate a research component in each course offered in the LL.M. programme that would be one of the bases for evaluating the students’ grades. Another way of improving the quality of legal research is to make publication in journals/ law review compulsory in the LL.M. programme. At present, this is done at the research degree level [Rule 9.4, University Grants Commission (Minimum Standards and Procedure for Award of M.PHIL./PH.D Degrees) Regulations, 2016 reads: “M.Phil scholars shall present at least one (1) research paper in a conference/seminar and Ph.D. scholars must publish at least one (1) research paper in refereed journal and make two paper presentations in conferences/seminars before the submission of the dissertation/thesis for adjudication, and produce evidence for the same in the form of presentation certificates and/or reprints.”].

But, if legal research in India is to be improved, this drastic measure has to be introduced even in the LL.M. programme. At least one publication by each student should be made mandatory. This will make students undertake serious legal research.

Another hindrance to learning legal research skills in the LL.M. programme is that the unimaginative syllabus of the course on legal research methodology. The legal research methodology courses are offered based on text books/ reading materials that either borrow heavily concepts of research methodology from social/ physical sciences or do not reflect the latest practices in legal research. It is time that legal research methodology courses taught in India reflect the current trends in legal research. This includes introducing the students to advanced research avenues like empirical legal studies, statistics-based legal research, and so on. Further, it is important to bring out course content at a national level on legal research methodology that would equip students to undertake legal research, understand concepts of legal research and learn the latest developments in the field of legal research.

Making Internships/ Training a part of the LL.M. ProgrammeAs stated previously, UGC Guidelines contemplates practical training in law as a method of evaluating performance of students. Institutions/ Universities could offer or support various types of internship/ training programmes such as internships in Non-Governmental Organisations, law firms, offices of advocates, corporations or even in educational institutions in the form of teaching internships. These could be made a compulsory part of the LL.M. programme so that students are well-equipped to have a practical perspective of law and, possibly, apply their research skills in the legal domain in which they undergo internship or training. This will go a long way in equipping them to apply their legal research skills in the legal domain in which they would work after passing out from the LL.M. programme. 

Often, academicians think that a practical training of law is irrelevant to post gradute courses on law such as LL.M., M.Phil, etc. This is an unfortunate trend. If academicians are unaware of how law works in practice, how would they perform their primary duty of undertaking legal research for proposing legal reforms?

Comprehensive Ranking of Institutions offering LLM ProgrammesIn order to jumpstart the reforms in the LLM programme, it would do good to introduce a comprehensive methodology based ranking of the institutions offering LLM programme. This would benefit the students at least in two ways: one, a proper methodology-based ranking would foster healthy competition between institutions in making the LLM programme more attractive to the students. This would results in one institution trying to better the other in order to attain better rankings. The second benefit is that it would aid the students in choosing an institution which offers the best value for their time and money. At present, there are no such comprehensive rankings for institutions offering LL.M.


Of all, two crucial challenges face postgraduate legal education in India at the Masters level. The first challenge is the dearth of student quality. This series of posts argued that one of the ways of addressing this problem was by selecting only the most serious students through a rigorous entrance examination. Pre-admission orientation programmes with rigorous training of students who are to attend the LL.M. programme was another way discussed to counter this problem. It is suggested that these orientation programmes would be a better bridge to reduce the gap between institutional expectations and student quality.

The second important challenge is to address problem that permeates not only the post graduate legal education but also legal education in general- the disconnect between law as taught in law colleges and law-in-practice. The chief contributor to this state of affairs is the way in which legal academia is structured. Either the faculty members are not adequately equipped to deal with the practical aspects of a particular law course or even if they are, they are not able to devise teaching methods which will enable them teach both theoretical and practical approaches to law. This is especially true in LL.M. where specialised courses are studied. Often Universities/ Institutions hold the view that for an LL.M. course, there is no need to teach law from a practical stand point. This is a misconception even for those institutions which hold the orthodox view that the LL.M. course is to train law teachers. Even in that case, the prospective law teachers would not be adequately trained in a practical approach to law thereby furthering the disconnect between taught law and law-in-practice.

At present, there seems to be no fool proof method to address the second challenge. Universities/ Institutions either recruit full time law faculty members who are academicians through and through or practitioners as part-time faculty members. Once the former begin their career as academicians, they are hardly trained on the practical aspects of law. The latter give least importance to the theoretical aspects of law while the former do stress mostly on theoretical aspects of law. The possible way to address this problem is to invite committed practitioners/ industry experts to take up law academics (research and teaching) full time with attractive salaries. At present, except in certain rare cases in National Law Schools, University/ Institutional regulations do not systematically address this aspect. As a consequence, several industry experts have either shifted to foreign universities or have gone to elite private law schools which provide attractive salaries and also offer adequate facilities for research or otherwise.

Real reforms in the LL.M. programme in India would be possible only if these two fundamental problems are addressed.

(Many thanks to Ms. Smitha Poovani, Ms. Madhavi Nalluri, Mr. MLS Kaarmukilan, Mr. J. Ravichandran, Ms. Jasmine Joseph and Dr. Ananya Chakraborty for their inputs on the subject).